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Abstract 
This paper attempts to highlight the main principles of Competition Law (regulatory and case law 
framework) covering the prohibition of parallel imports and to reveal the main effects of it on the 
competitive structure of the market. Especially, the regulatory framework relates Block Exception 
Regulation 330/2010 with Block Exception Regulation 461/2010 in order to determine whether 
prohibition of parallel imports constitutes a hardcore restriction or not, while the economic analysis 
evaluates it in a vertical market with few suppliers & buyers which sell goods to the final (domestic) 
consumers. The results indicate that the prohibition of parallel imports by upstream sellers cause 
vertical restraints to the domestic customers of the buyers. In any case, this paper focusing mainly on 
consumer welfare, does not necessarily link parallel imports with the notion of parallel trade and/or 
parallel exports as well as it does not provide the pros and cons of parallel trade. 
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1. Introductοry remarks  
Block Exception Regulation (BER) 330/20101 (ex BER 2790/992) states that article 
101(1) of the Treaty shall not apply to vertical agreements, whereas such agreements 
contain vertical restraints (ar.2) and the market share held by the supplier does not 
exceed 30 % of the relevant market on which it sells the contract goods or services 
and the market share held by the buyer does not exceed 30 % of the relevant market 
on which it purchases the contract goods or services (ar. 3). 
Also, BER 461/20103 (ex BER1400/20024) declares that article 101(1) of the Treaty 
shall not apply to vertical agreements relating to the conditions under which the 
parties may purchase, sell or resell spare parts for motor vehicles or provide repair 
and maintenance services for motor vehicles, which fulfil the requirements for an 
exemption under Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 and do not contain any of the 
hardcore clauses listed in Article 5 of this Regulation, (see below) whereas such 
agreements contain vertical restraints (article 4).  
However, both BERs contain hardcore restrictions that remove the benefit of the 
block exemption. Especially, article 4 of BER 330/2010 (see below) outlines the basic 
categories of hardcore restrictions, for which the exception provided for in the 
abovementioned article 2 of BER shall not apply to vertical agreements.  
The main question which this paper tries to answer is whether prohibition of parallel 
imports constitutes a hardcore restriction of BER for vertical agreements, that is a per 
se approach. For this purpose, we analyse the existing regulatory framework in 
combination with case law in a real economic environment so as to determine if the 
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prohibition of parallel imports by upstream suppliers may cause vertical restraints in 
the downstream market and especially the customers of the buyers5.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 provide as well 
as evaluate the main principles of BER 330/2010 & BER 461/2010 respectively. 
Section 4 combines both BERs, while section 5 highlights some administrative 
anticompetitive measures. Section 6 imports the theoretical argument into real 
economic environment. Lastly, section 7 provides some conclusions. 
2. The content of the General Block Exemption 
Regulation (BER 330/2010) 
2.1 Hard core restrictions 
Logically, it would be expected that the prohibition of parallel imports would be 
explicitly referred as a hardcore restriction in the content of article 4 of BER 330/20 
(‘Restrictions that remove the benefit of the block exemption — hardcore 
restrictions’). According to this, “The exemption provided for in Article 2 shall not 
apply to vertical agreements which, directly or indirectly, in isolation or in 
combination with other factors under the control of the parties, have as their object: 
(a) the restriction of the buyer's ability to determine its sale price, without 
prejudice to the possibility of the supplier to impose a maximum sale price or 
recommend a sale price, provided that they do not amount to a fixed or minimum 
sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties;  
(b) the restriction of the territory into which, or of the customers to whom, a buyer 
party to the agreement, without prejudice to a restriction on its place of 
establishment, may sell the contract goods or services6,  
                                                 
5
 According to BER 330/2010, 1(i), ‘customer of the buyer’ means an undertaking not party to the 
agreement which purchases the contract goods or services from a buyer which is party to the agreement.’ 
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(c) the restriction of active or passive sales to end users by members of a selective 
distribution system operating at the retail level of trade, without prejudice to the 
possibility of prohibiting a member of the system from operating out of an 
unauthorised place of establishment;  
(d) the restriction of cross-supplies between distributors within a selective 
distribution system, including between distributors operating at different level of 
trade;  
(e) the restriction, agreed between a supplier of components and a buyer who 
incorporates those components, of the supplier’s ability to sell the components as 
spare parts to end-users or to repairers or other service providers not entrusted by 
the buyer with the repair or servicing of its goods”7. 
It is obvious that there are no specific provisions for the prohibition of parallel 
imports as a hardcore restriction. Consequently, according to the basic principle 
governing BER 330/2010 (as well as the former BER 2790/99), which provides that 
whatever is not prohibited by article 4 is permitted8, it would be expected that the 
prohibition of parallel imports is not a hardcore restriction.  
However, the significance of parallel trade protection is mentioned in the new 
Guidelines about vertical restraints9, mainly in paragraph 25, where it is referred as an 
instance that “if after a supplier's announcement of a unilateral reduction of supplies 
in order to prevent parallel trade, distributors reduce immediately their orders and 
                                                                                                                                            
6
 Except from (i) the restriction of active sales into the exclusive territory or to an exclusive customer 
group reserved to the supplier or allocated by the supplier to another buyer, where such a restriction 
does not limit sales by the customers of the buyer, (ii) the restriction of sales to end users by a buyer 
operating at the wholesale level of trade, (iii) the restriction of sales by the members of a selective 
distribution system to unauthorised distributors within the territory reserved by the supplier to operate 
that system, and (iv) the restriction of the buyer's ability to sell components, supplied for the purposes 
of incorporation, to customers who would use them to manufacture the same type of goods as those 
produced by the supplier”. 
7
 See O.J. L102/1, 23.4.2010, p. 5. 
8
 See Dethmers F. & Posthuma de Boer P. (2009) p. 425. 
9
 O.J. C130/01, 19.05.2010. 
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stop engaging in parallel trade, then those distributors tacitly acquiesce to the 
supplier's unilateral policy. This can however not be concluded if the distributors 
continue to engage in parallel trade or try to find new ways to engage in parallel 
trade”10.  
In any case, in our view, before someone can come to a conclusion whether the 
prohibition of parallel trade constitutes a hardcore restriction or not, it would be wise 
to examine the following issues: Firstly, the necessity of focusing on the 
interpretation of article’s 4 content of the Block Exemption 330/2010 and the 
consideration of the guidelines about vertical restraints in combination with the 
content of Regulation 461/2010 and its relevant guidelines, secondly, the possibility 
that such a point of view would come in contradiction with the settled case law about 
parallel imports and thirdly, the characteristics of the markets in which parallel trade 
prohibition is imposed. 
2.2 Prohibition of parallel imports as an effective measure for RPM 
The hardcore restriction set out in article 4(a) of the BER 330/2010 focuses on Resale 
Price Maintenance (RPM), that is, agreements or concerted practices having as their 
direct or indirect object the establishment of a fixed or minimum resale price or a 
fixed or minimum price level to be observed by the buyer. In the case of contractual 
provisions or concerted practices that directly establish the resale price, the restriction 
is clear cut.  
However, RPM can also be achieved through indirect means. Examples of this 
include: an agreement fixing the distribution margin, fixing the maximum level of 
discount the distributor can grant from a prescribed price level, making the grant of 
rebates or reimbursement of promotional costs by the supplier subject to the 
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 See para. 25 (a). 
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observance of a given price level, linking the prescribed resale price to the resale 
prices of competitors, threats, intimidation, warnings, penalties, delay or suspension 
of deliveries or contract terminations in relation to observance of a given price level. 
Direct or indirect means of achieving price fixing can be made more effective when 
combined with measures to identify price-cutting distributors, such as the 
implementation of a price monitoring system, or the obligation of retailers to report 
other members of the distribution network that deviate from the standard price level.  
Similarly, direct or indirect price fixing can be made more effective when combined 
with measures which may reduce the buyer's incentive to lower the resale price, such 
as the supplier printing a recommended resale price on the product or the supplier 
obliging the buyer to apply a most-favoured-customer clause. The same indirect 
means and the same "supportive" measures can be used to make maximum or 
recommended prices work as RPM.  
However, the use of a particular supportive measure or the provision of a list of 
recommended prices or maximum prices by the supplier to the buyer is not considered 
in itself as RPM11. Nevertheless, it should also be assessed that in few cases12, 
maximum and recommended prices will work as a focal point for the resellers and 
might be followed by most or all of them; in such cases the possible competition risk 
is that maximum or recommended prices may soften competition or even facilitate 
collusion between suppliers. 
The strategy of parallel imports’ prohibition may be seen as a measure which reduces 
the buyer’s incentive to reduce resale price by diminishing the sources of supply. 
Such a strategy may dangerously raise the level of selling prices of the products in 
question, since the elimination of sources of supply restricts the ability of the buyer to 
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 See O.J. L102/1, 19.05.2010, para. 48. 
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distribute the product in a profitable way. As a consequence of this, the consumer 
welfare is negatively influenced.  
Consumer welfare may also be negatively influenced in cases where the 
abovementioned strategy takes place in markets where the buyers resell the products 
in question to domestic customers of the buyers. In our view, such a product market 
example may have more severe anticompetitive effects since the buyers of the 
downstream market are not export oriented firms. 
Lastly, by imposing a price floor, an upstream firm increases the non-cooperative 
profits of downstream firms and makes collusion relatively less profitable. As a result, 
collusion may be destabilized and the price floor enables a manufacturer to prevent 
collusive behavior among downstream firms (Overvest B 2010).  
2.3 The argument of exclusive supply  
Hypothetically speaking, if someone is in favour of the opinion that the prohibition of 
parallel imports is not a hardcore restriction, he or she could argue that, since the 
prohibition of parallel imports seem to have the same results with an exclusive supply 
agreement, therefore de facto constitutes an exclusive supply.  
Nevertheless, at this point an absolutely necessary distinction ought to be made: the 
exclusive supply of specific products of a trademark is not the same with the 
exclusive supply of a specific trademark by itself; in the first case, the exclusive 
supply of specific products of a specific trademark is legal, since it does not prohibit 
the parallel imports of these products of the same trademark; If a retailer can find the 
same products of the same trademark by a cheaper source of supply (for instance, a 
wholesaler or an authorized dealer in an other member state), he can buy them in 
order to resell them without breaking the exclusive supply agreement.  
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 See O.J. L102/1, 19.05.2010, para 227.  
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On the contrary, the exclusive supply of a specific trademark by itself, which actually 
constitutes exclusive source of supply13 and not exclusive supply, should be treated in 
a completely different way, because it de facto constitutes an indirect (but effective) 
prohibition of parallel imports; in this case, the real purpose of the exclusive supply 
agreement concerning not specific products but a trademark as a whole is not a non 
compete obligation14, but to prevent the retailer from finding products of the same 
trademark in lower prices by other sources. So, the point of view that prohibition of 
parallel imports constitutes an exclusive supply agreement and therefore ought to be 
allowed as a practice is postponed; an exclusive supply agreement which indirectly 
prevent parallel imports is always (inherently) illegal.  
3. The content of the Motor Vehicles Block Exemption 
Regulation (BER 461/2010) 
3.1 The content of supplementary guidelines 
The necessity for protection of parallel trade in the motor vehicles sector is formulated 
absolutely clearly in the Commission notice — Supplementary guidelines15 on 
vertical restraints in agreements for the sale and repair of motor vehicles and for the 
distribution of spare parts for motor vehicles16,17. The Commission considers the 
                                                 
13
 Exclusive sourcing is something different, since in this case the existence of exclusive distributors is 
demanded; according to para 162 of the Guidelines on vertical restraints [O.J. C130/01, 19.05.2010], 
“[e]xclusive sourcing, requiring the exclusive distributors to buy their supplies for the particular brand 
directly from the manufacturer, eliminates in addition possible arbitrage by the exclusive distributors, 
which are prevented from buying from other distributors in the system”. 
14
 See D.G. Goyder (2004), p. 187. See also para 129 of the Guidelines on vertical agreements [O.J. 
C130/01, 19.05.2010] referring that: “Under the heading of ‘single branding’ fall those agreements 
which have as their main element the fact that the buyer is obliged or induced to concentrate its orders 
for a particular type of product with one supplier. That component can be found amongst others in 
non- compete and quantity-forcing on the buyer. A non- compete arrangement is based on an 
obligation or incentive scheme which makes the buyer purchase more than 80% of its requirements on 
a particular market from only one supplier. It does not mean that the buyer can only buy directly 
from the supplier, but that the buyer will not buy and resell or incorporate competing goods or 
services” [emphasis added].  
15
 O.J. C138/16, 28.05.2010. 
16
 See Clark J. and Simon S., (2010), pp. 1-13 and Simon S., (2010), pp. 83-91. 
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protection of parallel trade in the motor vehicles sector as an important competition 
objective, since the internal market has enabled consumers to purchase motor vehicles 
in other Member States and take advantage of price differentials between them18. 
The main concept of the internal market is the consumer's ability to buy goods in 
other Member States. This ability is especially important as far as motor vehicles are 
concerned, given the high value of the goods and the direct benefits in the form of 
lower prices accruing to consumers buying motor vehicles elsewhere in the Union. It 
cannot be ignored that the specific nature19 of the motor vehicle ought to be taken into 
account, since it is one of the most complex products20. The Commission is therefore 
concerned that distribution agreements, generally but also specifically in this 
particular sector, should not restrict parallel trade, since this cannot be expected to 
satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 101(3) of the Treaty21. It is remarkable that 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in its C-338/00P (Volkswagen/Commission) 
decision clearly ruled that “[…] a measure which is liable to partition the market 
between Member States cannot come under those provisions of Regulation No 123/85 
that deal with the obligations which a distributor may lawfully assume under a 
dealership contract. The Court of First Instance properly held in paragraph 49 of the 
judgment under appeal that, although that regulation provided manufacturers with 
substantial means by which to protect their distribution systems, it did not authorise 
                                                                                                                                            
17
 The new guidelines about the motor vehicle sector are called “supplementary”, since they should be 
read combined with the guidelines on vertical agreements. According to J. Clark and S. Simon, (2010), 
p. 3, “[t]he guidelines carry the word supplementary in their title to signal that they have to be read in 
conjunction with the General Vertical Guidelines”. 
18See the Commission notice — Supplementary guidelines on vertical restraints in agreements for the 
sale and repair of motor vehicles and for the distribution of spare parts for motor vehicles [O.J. 
C138/16, 28.05.2010], para 48. 
19
 See Karydis G. and Zevgolis N., (2009), p.95. 
20
 As Goyder D.G., (2004), p.203 has mentioned: ‘‘The motor car is probably the most complex 
consumer product of all, as well as being the most expensive purchase that many consumers ever 
make’’. See also Vezzoso S., (2004), p.190-191 who wrote: ‘‘The whole concept was centred on the 
belief that the car was not an ordinary good’’. 
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them to adopt measures which contributed to a partitioning of the market (Bayerische 
Motorenwerke, cited above, paragraph 37)”22. That said, the application of a BER 
461/2010 should never be used as an excuse for the partitioning of the market. 
Besides, compartmentalisation of the market is not included (and cannot be included) 
in the purposes of a Block Exemption Regulation. 
3.2 Case law in motor vehicle sector 
The relevant case law can safely be considered as settled, since the Commission has 
brought several cases against motor vehicle manufacturers for impeding parallel 
trade, and its decisions have been largely confirmed by the European Courts23. This 
experience shows that restrictions on parallel trade may take a number of forms 
(direct or indirect)24,25.A supplier may put pressure on distributors, threaten them with 
contract termination, fail to pay bonuses, refuse to honour warranties on motor 
vehicles imported by a consumer or cross-supplied between distributors established in 
different Member States, or make a distributor wait significantly longer for delivery 
of an identical motor vehicle when the consumer in question is resident in another 
Member State. The relative remarks of Advocate General Antonio Tizzano in the 
General Motors case (C-551/03P) are very characteristic. According to his view, 
“ […] such an objective [compartmentalisation of the single market26] can be 
achieved not only by direct restrictions on exports but also through indirect measures 
aimed at deterring a dealer from making foreign sales, particularly by influencing the 
economic and financial conditions of such operations. The Court of Justice has thus 
                                                                                                                                            
21
 The notion that cross-border trade restrictions may harm consumers has been confirmed by the Court 
in Case C-551/03 P, para 67 and 68; Case C-338/00 P, para 44 and 49 and Case T-450/05, para 46-49. 
22
 O.J. C138/16, 28.05.2010, para 49. 
23
 See Case IV/35.733 — VW, Case COMP/36.653 — Opel, Case COMP/36.264, Cases F-
2/36.623/36.820/37.275. 
24
 O.J. C138/16, 28.05.2010, para 49. 
25
 See indicatively Bellamy C. and Child G., (2001), para. 7-053. See also Korah V. & O’Sullivan D., 
(2002), p. 58.  
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regarded as inherently restrictive of competition measures which, like the measure at 
issue here, ‘make parallel imports more difficult’27 by subjecting them to treatment 
less favourable than that reserved for official imports or ‘restricting the buyer’s 
freedom to use the goods supplied in accordance with his own economic 
interests’ 28,29”. The Advocate General’s point of view had been accepted by the 
ECJ30. 
 The case where a distributor is unable to obtain new motor vehicles with the 
appropriate specifications needed for cross-border sales constitutes a particular 
example of indirect restrictions on parallel trade31. In those specific circumstances, the 
benefit of the block exemption may depend on whether a supplier provides its 
distributors with motor vehicles with specifications identical to those sold in other 
Member States for sale to consumers from those countries (the so-called "availability 
clause")32.  
4. Distribution of new motor vehicles as a point of 
combination of the two Block Exemption Regulations 
It could be said that the two Block Exemptions, ie 330/2010 and 461/2010, are 
actually combined. According to recital 10 of the preamble of the BER 461/2010, 
with regard to distribution of new motor vehicles33, there are not any more significant 
competition shortcomings which would distinguish this sector from other economic 
                                                                                                                                            
26
 Addition made by the authors. 
27
 Judgment in Cases 96-102, 104, 105, 108 and 110/82, para 6. 
28
 Judgment in Case 319/82, para 6. 
29
 Such principles are also to be found in the Community rules governing the application of Article 81 
EC to distribution agreements [already Article 101 of the Treaty]. 
30
 See Court’s decision, para. 68.  
31
 O.J. C138/16, 28.05.2010, para. 50. 
32
 Joined Cases 25 and 26/84. 
33
 See the Commission Evaluation Report on the Operation of Regulation (EC) No 1400/2002 
concerning motor vehicle distribution and servicing (28 May 2008), p. 14 and the Commission 
Communication on The Future Competition Law Framework applicable to the Motor Vehicle sector of 
22 July 2009 [COM(2009) 388]. 
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sectors (such as vertical relations) “and which could require the application of rules 
different from and stricter than those set out in Regulation (EU) No 330/2010”.  
The market-share threshold, the non-exemption of certain vertical agreements and the 
other conditions laid down in Regulation 330/2010 normally ensure that vertical 
agreements for the distribution of new motor vehicles comply with the requirements 
of Article 101(3) of the Treaty. Therefore, vertical agreements for the distribution of 
new motor vehicles ought to benefit from the exemption granted by Regulation (EU) 
No 330/2010, subject to all the conditions laid down therein.  
Furthermore, since the settled case law about the protection of parallel trade concerns 
basically the distribution of new motor vehicles, it is obvious that the protection of 
parallel imports or exports –either concerning vertical agreements in the new motor 
vehicles sector or vertical agreements in an other sector – is (and should be) the same: 
it is about a hardcore restriction, consequently per se approach. 
5. Administrative anticompetitive measures - 
measures of having equivalent effect 
Nevertheless, in some cases it is a member state (and not the manufacturer of a motor 
vehicle or a producer generally) which creates an indirect restriction on parallel trade 
or negatively influences parallel trade by specific administrative means; it is about the 
case of measures having equivalent effect. For instance, concerning the sector of 
motor vehicles, the ECJ in its recent decision C-170/0734 (Commission of the 
European Communities v Republic of Poland) declared that, by subjecting imported 
second-hand vehicles registered in other Member States to a roadworthiness test prior 
to their registration in Poland, whereas domestic vehicles with the same 
                                                 
34
 The case concerns second hand vehicles. 
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characteristics are not subject to such a requirement, the Republic of Poland had failed 
to fulfil its obligations under Article 28 EC (already Article 34).  
It is estimated that the ratio of the above mentioned decision of the ECJ adds up to its 
decision C-154/85 (Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic)35. 
In this case the ECJ ruled that article 30 (then 28 and already 34) of the Treaty, 
prohibiting measures having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction, is infringed 
by an increase by a member state (Italy) in the number of administrative requirements 
involving the production of documents necessary for parallel imports of vehicles, 
whether new or already registered, from other member states.  
Those requirements, which make registration of the vehicles more complicated, 
longer and most costly, cannot be justified on grounds of public policy connected with 
the detection or prevention of dealing in stolen vehicles36, since they cannot be 
regarded as necessary for that purpose (principle of proportionality). That is, a case 
where the information required duplicates that supplied by the authorities of the 
exporting member state and less restrictive measures would be sufficient to achieve 
the desired objective. In reality, it was about an unacceptable distinction between 
domestic and imported goods (motor vehicles).  
6. The sector of detergents for domestic use in Greece 
6.1 National Law 
According to the national regulatory framework which rules the sector of detergents 
for domestic use in Greece, a Greek wholesaler who intends to make parallel imports 
concerning detergents is obliged to follow very strict rules. More specifically, firstly, 
the free circulation of detergents for domestic use is based on European legislation (ie 
                                                 
35
 [1987] ECR 2717. 
36
 See para. 14 of the Court’s decision.  
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mainly on Regulation 648/200437 and Regulation 907/200638 with the Directives 
67/548/EEC39 and 1999/45/EC40, as they have been amended). In Greece the 
application of the abovementioned legislation is controlled and applied by the State’s 
General Chemical Laboratory and the Supreme Chemical Council.  
These two public organisations adopt unjustifiably (in our view)41 the stricter 
interpretation of the provisions in the abovementioned legislation, and the result is 
that the Greek regulatory framework is formed in a completely different way in 
comparison with the framework applied to the rest of the European Union. The 
marking (do you mean marketing?) of detergents for domestic use that can be 
circulated legally in Greece is significantly stricter in Greece than in other member 
states (even more in comparison with the corresponding products circulated in third 
countries). In practice, the potential importer of detergents for domestic use has to 
deposit all the necessary documents42 - between them, the specific content of each 
detergent in centigrams - to the abovementioned public organisations, in order to be 
licensed for the imported detergents. Actually, the Greek regulatory framework 
regarding the sector of detergents for domestic use constitutes a kind of measure 
having equivalent effect43. It is obvious that under these strict circumstances the 
‘legal’ parallel imports of detergents for domestic use in Greece are practically almost 
                                                 
37
 OJ L104/01, 08.04.2004. 
38
 OJ L168/05, 21.06.2006. 
39
 OJ 196/1, 16.08.1967. 
40
 OJ L 200/1, 30.07.1999. 
41
 In our view, in issues of consumer protection the Greek authorities can not presented as more 
“sensitive” then the German or the French authorities, for example. 
42
 The authors cannot refer in this paper in full detail all the necessary preconditions demanded for 
‘legal’ parallel imports of detergents for domestic use in Greece. However, if necessary, they can 
provide with further details-information about these preconditions. 
43
 See Dassonville case [8/74, ECR 1974, 837] and Cassis de Dijon case [120/78, ECR. 1979, 649]. 
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impossible. The national legal framework for parallel imports in the specific sector is 
extremely strict, perhaps the most rigorous in the E.U.44.  
Due to the above measure having equivalent effect and the concentrations that have 
taken place, the sector of detergents for domestic use in Greece constitutes an 
oligopolistic market where only a small number of firms are active.  
Therefore, the sector of detergents for domestic use in Greece constitutes an 
oligopolistic market where only a small number of firms are active, because of the 
existence of measures having equivalent effect and the concentrations that have taken 
place45. These activated firms have the possibility to raise their profit margin in upper 
levels, due to the absence of competition in the specific market46.  
6.2 Competitive restraints 
The Greek example of parallel import prohibition concerns vertical restrictions 
imposed in distribution agreements. There is an upstream and a downstream market in 
which firms in both markets (sellers47 in upstream market and buyers48 in downstream 
market) behave in an oligopolistic way.  In the upstream market there are few but 
large producers/sellers of final goods whereas in the downstream market there are 
                                                 
44
 Probably, this is the reason why the Greek market mainly in the sector of detergents for domestic 
use is one of the most expensive (or maybe the most expensive) in the E.U. 
45
 See Fotis, P., Polemis, M., Zevgolis, N., (2011), p. 76-77 for a review of major concentrations that 
have been cleared by Hellenic Competition Commission during the period from 1995 to 2010. Also, 
see Fotis, P., Polemis, M., Zevgolis, N., (2009), p. 219-222 and Fotis P., Polemis M., (2011) for a 
financial and statistical analysis of concentrations in Greece respectively during the same period. In 
Fotis P., Polemis M., (2011) there is a review of the use in economic tools in merger analysis.    
46
 See Zevgolis N. and Fotis P., (2009), p. 1184-1190. According to the paper, the clause of prohibition 
of parallel imports constitutes a hardcore restriction of competition, since, ceteris paribus, it consists of 
a barrier to entry for potential competitors. By prohibiting the supply of products of a significant brand 
name by cheaper sources of supply, the clause has as its indirect (if not direct) object the maintenance 
of a minimum level of supply prices and resale prices of the specific products. As far as it concerns the 
Greek geographical market, the clause of prohibition of parallel imports aggravates the already 
restrictive national regulatory framework which rules the sector of detergents for domestic use, having 
as its result the restriction –if not the disappearance- of parallel imports of the specific products. 
47
 Sellers, wholesalers and producers are used interchangeably. 
48
 Supermarkets and buyers are used interchangeably.  
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firms/buyers that sell the upstream firms’ products to the final consumers (domestic 
costumers of the buyers).  
The upstream market especially involves the production and distribution of daily 
consumer goods to retailers49, such as detergents for domestic use. Upstream 
producers may also export the products in different geographical downstream product 
markets. Each producer specialises in individual products or product groups, such as 
fresh products, or dry food or non-food products (i.e. detergents). The latter are 
grouped into small segments each of which constitutes an individual product market, 
both from the demand and the supply side. In each product market a producer50 may 
hold a dominant position of economic strength or it is assumed to be the leader of the 
market51 (see fig. 1).  
 
Fig. 1 The Upstream & Downstream markets of daily consumer goods 
 
 
                                                 
49
 A small fraction of the upstream sales are sold to downstream wholesalers. Since that fraction of 
upstream sales consists of less than 10% of the total sales in the downstream market, in the remainder 
of the paper will assume that retailers are the only buyers of the upstream sales. 
50
 The same producer or different producers in each product market.  
51
 Stackelberg product market whereas the other firms of the product market are assumed to be the 
followers.  
Upstream Producers of daily consumer 
goods (Detergents) 
Few Oligopolists Sellers 
 
Downstream Supermarkets 
Few Oligopolists Buyers 
Exports 
Domestic Final Consumers 
“Customers of the Buyers” 
Foreign Geographic 
Markets 
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In the downstream market the firms are not export oriented. That is, they distribute the 
products to domestic final consumers. Therefore, the clause of prohibition of parallel 
imports includes both imports (directly) and exports (indirectly). The downstream 
firms provide a basket of foodstuffs and non-food household consumables sold in a 
supermarket environment52.  
The clause of parallel imports prohibition creates barriers to entry for potential 
competitors in the upstream market. The latter leads, ceteris paribus, to a restriction 
of competition in this market. Potential competitors with easy and effective entry in 
the upstream market may possibly prevent an already active firm in the upstream 
market from increasing the selling price of the final product to the supermarkets53. 
Also, the decrease (diminution) of competition intention by the mean of such a clause 
enforces the already powerful existence of upstream firms (sellers) with strong 
trademarks, driving a segmentation of the specific market in comparison with the rest 
of the national markets in the E.U. The prohibition of parallel imports creates almost 
automatically more available space for the already existing firms in the upstream 
market, active in the specific market, to raise or at least stabilize their market share 
and consequently to enforce their market power in the national market.  
6.3 An example 
6.3.1 Competition in the upstream & downstream markets 
In the downstream market a supermarket (costumer of buyers) may prefer to import 
the final good from different European geographic markets and takes advantage of 
                                                 
52
 See for example, inter alia, cases No IV/M.1612 (Wal-Mart/ASDA), No. IV/M. 784-Kesko/Tuko; 
No. IV/M. 1221-Rewe/Meinl or No. IV/M.1541-Kingfisher/ASDA. 
 
53
 Motta M., (2009), p. 104. 
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price differentials between them54. The scope of this strategy is to increase the 
supermarket’s market share via a decreased selling price of the final good55.  
However, if all the supermarkets exercise the same strategy, the effect on each 
supermarket’s market share and consequently on its profits, depends on the juncture 
where the strategy takes place. Generally speaking, whether each supermarket cannot 
foresee competitor’s counteraction, it is possible to overestimate the potential gaining 
from the abovementioned strategy.  
Additionally, the pursuit of the same strategy for a long period of time by all 
supermarkets, may lead in a ‘war of attrition’. This refers to a situation where the 
object of firms in a product market is to induce the competitors to give up and, 
consequently, to suffer economic losses in the short - run until their rivals exit the 
market. In such an environment, firms try to abstain closing plants and giving up 
market share as they would increase their costs56. This situation in game theory is 
referred to as a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’57.  
In the upstream market, producers of the final good get the point that downstream 
firms would not preferred to engage in a ‘price war’ since that may ultimately 
eliminate their profits. At the same time, they realize that potential explicit or tacit 
collusive behavior from the supermarkets may cut down their profits, especially in the 
case where the upstream market “behaves” competitively. 
Therefore, upstream firms will try to eliminate the possibility of the aforementioned 
behavior by imposing vertical restrictions in distribution agreements. Such a policy 
                                                 
54
 For an example see para. 48 of the Commission notice — Supplementary guidelines on vertical 
restraints in agreements for the sale and repair of motor vehicles and for the distribution of spare parts 
for motor vehicles [O.J. C138/16, 28.05.2010]. 
55
 The supermarket will not increase the price of the final good in the future since that will give the 
opportunity to the other supermarkets to enjoy increased profits. 
56
 Sectors characterized by increasing returns to scale and/or large costs of exit in case of high fixed or 
sunk costs are among the fundamental examples in which a ‘war of attrition’ may take place.  
57
 See J. Tirole (1998), p. 425-426. 
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smuggles away the risk of anticompetitive practices by the downstream firms and 
ensures the upstream firm’s profits in upper normal levels. The final goal of strategic 
interaction between upstream & downstream firms is to enhance the ‘producer 
welfare’ without considering the probable reduction of ‘consumer welfare’ via high 
prices of final goods.  
Downstream firms recognize the increased strategic power of upstream firms with 
respect to their ability to bargain better terms in distribution agreements. They also 
realize that eventually, cooperation with sellers will reach a settlement which 
increases their profits. 
6.3.2 A repeated game among upstream suppliers and costumer of 
buyers of detergents for domestic use 
Both producers and supermarkets prefer to cooperate rather than to engage in a «war 
of attrition». Also, both of them are patient, that is, they prefer to get the profits which 
accrue from the long – run time span, rather than to get the short – run returns and 
they communicate in frequently temporal periods. Therefore, if supermarkets choose 
not to cooperate with upstream producers, the short – run payoff is less than the long – 
run profits (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 One – Shoot game upstream suppliers and costumer of buyers (supermarkets) 
of detergents for domestic use 
 
Buyer (supermarket) 
Seller (producer) 
Strategies CHEAT NO CHEAT 
NO COOPERATION 25, 25 50, 0 
COOPERATION 0, 50 40, 40 
Payoffs in mil. euro 
Cheat/No Cheat: imports/no imports of final good from different geographical areas 
Cooperation/No cooperation: distribution agreement/no distribution agreement which 
prohibits imports of final good from a different geographical areas 
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Additionally, an upstream seller will eventually realize whether a supermarket strives 
to cheat by choosing not to cooperate while, the profits from cheating are less than the 
cost of cheating.  
The payoffs of buyer and seller are their profits58.  Consumer welfare increases as 
soon as all the other supermarkets in the downstream market do not follow the same 
strategy. The Nash equilibrium of the static game reveals that the selling price of the 
final good remains low since each player simultaneously maximizes its profit by 
choosing the dominated Nash equilibrium.  
The dominated strategy for supermarkets is cheat and the equivalent dominated 
strategy for producers is no cooperation (25>1 & 50>40)59. The static game results in 
a dominated Nash – equilibrium even though both players may increase their profits 
by ‘communicating’ between each other (the payoffs for both players are 40). 
However, if all the supermarkets follow to cheat, that will trigger a war price among 
each other which eventually results in profit losses. Although this is the best scenario 
for the consumers, firms in both levels of the vertical chain realize that the best for 
them is not to independently choose their strategies. 
Suppose now that upstream and downstream firms communicate in frequently 
temporal periods. That is, the game is repeated in the near future. We assume that the 
static game of complete information is repeated infinitely, with the results of all 
previous periods observed before the current period begins. For each t  period the 
results for each 1−t  preceding periods of the game are observed before the tht  period 
begins. In our example the periods cover different distribution agreements among 
                                                 
58
 The lower the selling price of the final good, the higher the market penetration and hence the profits 
of an individual supermarket. 
59
 The first column presents the producer’s payoff and the second column presents the supermarkets’ 
payoff.    
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producers and supermarkets. The results of the distribution agreements are known to 
both them before the new period begins. 
We denote ( )
( )r
p
+
−
=
1
1
δ  the discount factor60 of producers and supermarkets where  
is the probability that the game will end immediately after a period and  is the 
probability that the game continues at least one more period. The payoffs for each 
chosen set of strategy by upstream and downstream firms are given by the 2X2 game 
matrix in Table 1. 
The present value of the infinite sequence of payoffs nt ,......,3,2,1=  is given by 
t
i
t payoffpayoffpayoffpayoff ∑
∞
=
−=+++
1
1
3
2
21 .........  δδδ    (1) 
Equation (1) reflects both the time value of money & the probability the game will 
end. Equation (1) reflects both the time value of money & the probability the game 
will end. For example, at 1=t
, 
the payoff worths ( )
( )r
payoffp
+
−
1
1
, while in 2=t  it 
worths ( )
( )r
payoffp
+
−
1
1 2
. 
Following payoffs in Table 1 we argue that cooperation among producers and 
supermarkets may occur in every period of distribution agreements (or, cooperation 
may occur in every period of a subgame perfect outcome of the infinitely repeated 
game) if both sides from the vertical chain commit from the outset that they choose 
the high payoff equilibrium (cooperation). Otherwise, they will choose the low payoff 
equilibrium (cheat) in the subsequent periods61. 
Upstream firms will cooperate with downstream firms if the latter do not import the 
final good from different European geographical areas. Downstream firms prefer not 
                                                 
60
 The value today of a euro to be received one period later, where  is the interest rate per period.  
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to import the final good since the profits from cooperation are higher than the profits 
from cheating. 
A supermarket cooperates if 62. According to figure 2, the straight distance 
AB depicts a lump sum payoff of a supermarket after cheating and the distance ΒΓ 
shows the reduction of supermarket’s payoff if an upstream producer decides to 
follow the trigger strategy. A supermarket cheats whether Γ> BAB and cooperates if 
the distance AΓ is higher than the distance ΒΓ (that is, AB>ΒΓ ). Figure 2 depicts 
the payoffs of the infinitely repeated game among producers and supermarkets 
according to the aforementioned trigger strategy.  
 
Fig. 2 Payoffs of the infinitely repeated game among producers (sellers) and 
supermarkets (buyers) 
 
 
     50 
      
     40                                                                                                 
                                               Payoffs 
     25 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
61
 This strategy is called trigger strategy.  
62
 The infinite payoff when a supermarket cheats or cooperates is   or   
correspondingly. A supermarket cooperates if     or  . 
Periods of distribution agreements 
A 
B 
Γ 
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Following cooperation, the price of final goods remains in upper normal levels. 
Supermarkets do not cheat (import the final good) and therefore the consumer welfare 
decreases.  
7. Concluding remarks 
The main question which this paper tries to answer is whether prohibition of parallel 
imports constitutes a hardcore restriction of Block Exception Regulation for vertical 
agreements, that is, a per se approach. 
In our view, the answer is yes. The prohibition of parallel imports is a measure which 
reduces the buyer’s incentive to decline resale price by diminishing the sources of 
supply, and consequently raising dangerously the selling prices and reducing the 
consumer welfare. An exclusive supply of a specific trademark by itself (exclusive 
source of supply), constitutes the same, since it prevents the retailer/buyer from 
finding products of the same trademark in lower prices by other sources. Above all, it 
constitutes an important anti-competitive objective for the internal market since it 
prevents consumers from purchasing products being imported from other Member 
States and taking advantage of price differentials between them.  
The abovementioned conclusions are further enhanced, at least in some cases, by the 
structure of the market and the national law of the member state (measures of having 
equivalent effect constitute an indicative example) where the prohibition of parallel 
imports takes place.  
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